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JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utaih 
State Prison, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
11788 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant seek.s a reversal of a judgment entered 
in the Third District Court, in and for the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, denying his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court, after examining the record and 
transcript of the sentencing proceedings, upon its own mo-
tion, and without a hearing, dismissed appellant's petition. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the decision of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent herewith accepts Appellant's statement 
of facts and adds the following. 
The transcript of the trial court proceedings wherein 
the appellant changed his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" 
was not a part of the record as submitted with appeHant's 
brief. However, part of appellant's argument challenges 
that proceeding. Therefore, the respondent has obtained 
said transcript and filed the same as a supplemental record 
in this case. Also, a copy of said transcript has been sent 
to advising him that the same is now a part of 
this case on appeal. 
In addition, the respondent asks this Court to take 
judicial notice of the fact that appellant never timely ap-




THIS COURT SHOULD NOT JUDICIALLY DE-
CIDE THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT. 
The appellant challenges the constitutionality of his 
conviction of grand larceny on the grounds thalt (1) he 
was denied adequate counsel, (2) that counsel was not 
present at the time flor sentencing, and (3) that he was 
not fully advised of his rights when he plead guilty. He 
did not timely appeal his conviction, but rather, has raised 
the foregoing issues by writ of habeas corpus, long after 
the time for appeal has expired. 
Utah law is clear under these circumstances. If one 
is convicted of a crime and fails to timely appeal, he cannot 
later use habeas corpus to gain appellate review. Bryant 
v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P. 2d 121 (1967). 
In the Bryant case, this Court explained the foregoing 
principle by saying: 
"We do not mean to say that the time honored 
writ of habeas corpus does not have a very im-
portant and useful purpose in our law. But that 
purpose is not to review a final judgment arrived 
at through regular proceedings and due process of 
law, by a court having jurisdiction. The writ is, 
as our rules describe it, an extraordinary writ, to 
be used to protect one who is restrained of his lib-
erty where there is no jurisdiction or authority, or 
where the requirements of the law have been so 
ignored or distorted that the party is substantially 
and effectively denied what is included in the term 
due proce.<;s of law ... " 19 Utah 2d at 286 and 287. 
Later in the opinion this Court concluded: 
."No appeal having been taken from the judg-
ment it became final and the issue was res adjudi-
cata. Therefore, consistent with the principles 
herein above disoussed, it is not subject to review 
in this habeas corpus proceeding." Id. at 287. (Em-
phasis added.) 
In the instant C&"le, the appellant should be denied the 
relief prayed for because he failed to redress his alleged 
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error by a timely appeal. This is so even though his ailleged 
errors are constitutional in nature. This Court implicitly 
so held in Brown V. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P. 2d 965 
(1968) . Brown was appealing a denial of his petition for 
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he was niot ac-
corded his right to counsel, and that he was not adequately 
advised of the consequences of his plea of guilty - the same 
contentions that the appellant in the in.sttant case is mak. 
ing. This Court cited Bryant in defining when the writ of 
habeas corpus is applicable, and then stated: 
"If tJhe oontention of error is something which 
i,s known or should :be known to the party at the 
time judgment was entered, it must be reviewed in 
the manner and within the time permitted by regu-
far prescribed procedure, or the judgment becomes 
final and is not subject to further attack, except in 
some unusual circumstances as we have mentioned 
above." 21 Utah 2d aJt 98. (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly, the appellant knew of the alleged errors sur-
rounding his conviction at the time of his trial and cer-
tainly could have challenged its validity by timely appeal-
ing to this Court. He did not elect to do so. Moreover, 
tJhere are no unusual circumstances surrounding this case 
which migiht invoke the exception as defined in the Bryant 
case and affirmed in the Brown case. Therefore, the judg· 
ment of the trial court became final 'and thus cannot now 
be reviewed on habeas corpus. 
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that this Court 
should not judicially decide the issues raised in this appeal, 
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but rather, should summarily affirm the judgment of the 
trial court below. 
POINT II. 
POINT I OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS NOT A 
JUSTICIABLE ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL. 
Point I of appellant's brief alleges that appellant was 
not adequately represented by counsel. However, this issue 
was not raised in his habeas corpus petition, nor was it 
considered by the trial court below. The appellant now 
wishes this Court to consider this issue for the first time 
on this appeal. 
Again, Utah law is clear regarding this matter. In 
Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 388 P. 2d 412 (1964), 
the petitioner appealed a denia:l of a writ of habeas corpus. 
On appeal, he raised a point for the first time which had 
neither been raised in his petition nor by the trial court. 
In disposing of this issue, the Court stated: 
"This matter was not presented in the plead-
ings or the hearing before the Fourth District 
Court. It is raised for the first time on appeal. 
Habeas corpus being a civil remedy, it is not neces-
sary for this Court to consider this point." 15 Utah 
2d at 120. 
See also Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P. 2d 788 
( 1967) and In re Ekker, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P. 2d 45 
( 1967). 
Thus this Court should not judicially decide Point I 
' 
as raised in the appellant's brief. 
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POINT III. 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED ADE-
QUATE COUNSEL BECAUSE THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER WAS ASSIGNED TO REPRESENT 
HE AND HIS CO-DEFENDANT. 
The United States Supreme Court has spoken on this 
issue and held that, pursuant to the Si:x:th Amendment, a 
def endanrt is entitled to separate counsel during his prose-
cution if he chooses, Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 
(1942). 
Glasser had been appointed counsel who had also been 
appointed to represent his co-defendant. Gla.sser objected 
to the appointment on the grounds that the dual appoint-
ment of counsel would result in prejudice to him, and thus, 
he requested independent counsel. The 'Urial court denied 
Glasser's request. Glasser appeal. The United States Su-
preme Court upheld his contention and said: 
" ... (we are also) clear that the 'assistance of 
counsel' .guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment con-
templates that such assistance be untrammeled and 
unimpaired by a court order requiring that one 
lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflictin.r; 
interests." 315 U. S. at 70. (Emphasis added.) 
Glasser had objected to the Court's simulitaneous appoint· 
ment of counsel and had pointed out to the court the nature 
of the conflict of interest which would result from the ap· 
pointment. 314 U. S. at 68 and 69. 
In the instant case, the record is silent on the issue of 
whether or not the appellant objected to the court when he 
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11·as assigned the legal defender as his counsel. Surely the 
appellant knew at the time that the legal defender had also 
been assigned to represent his co-defendant. Therefore, if 
such simultaneous appointment would have caused the ap-
pellant µ;:ejudice, then it was incumbent on him to so advise 
the Court. The Glasser case does not hold that one is en-
titled to appointment of independent counsel when he can-
not or does not advise the court of possible conflicts of 
interest which may r&'>ult in prejudice to him. 
This standard has been applied by the California Court 
of Appeals. In People v. Klimek, 172 Cal. App. 2d 36, 341 
P. 2d 722 (1959), ,the defendant appealed raising the same 
objection as the appellant now raises on this appeal. In 
answer thereto, the Court said : 
"In the instant case no objection was made by 
anyone, either prior to or during the entire trial, 
and it does not appear at all that the appellant or 
anyone, prior to the taking of this appeal, was not 
satisfied with the alleged appointment. Nor was 
there anything to indicate to the trial judge that 
there might be conflicting interests, hence it cannot 
be held that the trial judge failed in any responsi-
bility in the matter of affording appellant an oppor-
tunity for proper representation by counsel." 341 
P. 2d at 726. 
This same standard has been applied to habeas corpus 
petitioners as well. In In re Waltreus, 42 Gal. Rptr. 9, 397 
P. 2d 1001 (1965), the court said: 
"It would seem, however, that having been ad-
vised that he had a right to be repr&<;ented by the 
public defender it was incumbent upon petitioner, 
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had he wished to have other counsel assigiied . th , raise e matter in the trial court and there 1· . ' s no claim that he did so." 397 P. 2d at 1005. 
In the instant case, the appellant did not object to the 
simultaneous appointment of the legal defender as counsel 
for he and his co-defendant. As a result, the judge had no 
reason to suspect some possible conflict of interest. Th us, 
the court below should be affirmed on this issue. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT RECORD CLEARLY 
SHOWS THAT APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY 
AND AD E QUA TEL Y REPRESENTED BY 
COUNSEL AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING. 
.. 
It is clear that appellant was in fact represented by 
counsel at Ms sentencing (T. 7, 8, 9). However, appellant 
argues that because he had different counsel at his sen· 
tencing than he had during the proceedings prior thereto, 
that in effect he was denied right of counsel at a critical 
stage of the judicial process. He argues further that his 
prior had advised him that his sentence would be 
like that of his co-defendant, his co-defendant was sen-
tenced to one year in the county jail, (appellant's brief p. 
3), and that his new counsel was the cause of the judge 
sentencing him to an indeterminate term in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Appellant's contention can only establish grounds for 
habeas corpus relief if he can show that counsel at the time 
of his sentencing was incompetent or inadequate. 
In order for appellant to show that counsel was inade-
qu::J.te, he must state facts showing that his representation 
was so substandard as to render his representation a farce 
or a sham. In Barron v. State, 7 Ariz. App. 223, 437 P. 2d 
975 (1968), the Arizona Court of Appeals held: 
"We find no error in the lower court's denial of 
relief since the appellants have set forth no facts 
(citations omitted), which indicate the attorney's 
services were so substandard as to render his repre-
sentation a farce or a sham." 7 Ariz. App. at 225. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The following cases have also applied this same stand-
ard in habeas corpus proceedings: In re Beaty, 51 Cal. 
Rptr. 521, 414 P. 2d 817 (1966); McGee v. Crouse, 190 
Kan. 615, 376 P. 2d 792 (1962), and Grubbs v. State, 397 
P. 2d 522 (Okla., 1964). 
In the Beaty, supra, case, the California Supreme 
Court stated this standard for inadequacy of counsel and 
then gave an example of a situation which might reduce 
the representation to a farce or a sham: 
"If a crucial defense is withdrawn from the 
oase through the fai'lure of counsel to investigate 
carefully all defenses of fact and law, the defendant 
has not received adequate representation." 414 P. 
2d at 819. (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case, the appellant has made no factual 
allegations establishing a possible defense which may have 
been crucial at the time of his sentencing. He simply alleges 
that he had not seen his coun.s·el until the time he was called 
before the trial court for sentencing. 
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According to Utah law, the appellant has the burden 
to justify upsetting a conviction on habeas corpus, Syddall 
V. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 263, 437 P. 2d 194 (1968), and must 
allege sufficient facts to show that he was not adequately 
represented by counsel. Id. at 265. The appellant has not 
met this burden in the instant case; thus, the judgment of 
the court below should be affirmed. 
POINT V. 
APPELLANT WAS FULLY ADVISED OF THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA OF GUILTY. 
The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his 
guilty plea on the grounds that the court did not advise him 
of the consequences thereof. The respondent submits, hmr-
ever, that the appellant was thoroughly advised of the con-
sequences of his plea by his own counsel, the public de-
fender. The transcript of appellant's plea of guilty, pages 
2 and 3, support this contention. 
THE COURT: Alright, you understand, Mr. 
Lopez, if the court grants your motion to withdraw 
your former plea of not guilty to this charge and to 
allow you to enter a different plea, then you will 
thereby subject yourself to a possible indeterminate 
term in the Utah State Prison. Do you understand 
that? 
MR. LOPEZ: Yes. 
THE COURT: Record may so -show. And based 
thereon the defendant is given permission to with: 
draw his former plea of not guilty to the count ot 
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grand larceny. Do you desire the convenience of the 
record? 
MR. MITSUNAGA (defense counsel): Yes, 
sir. 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. MITSUN AGA: Mr. Lopez, I'm going to 
ask you some questions with regard to the plea that 
you are about to enter to grand larceny. Now, you 
are aware that grand larceny in the State of Utah 
calls for one to ten years in the state penitentiary? 
MR. LOPEZ: Yes. 
MR. MITSUNAGA: Now, has anyone from my 
office, either my staff or myself, offered you any 
promise or probation? 
MR. LOPEZ: No. 
MR. MITSUNAGA: Has anyone forced you or 
coerced you to get you to enter the plea you're about 
rto enter? 
MR. LOPEZ: No. 
MR. MITSUNAGA: Are you entering the plea 
on the basis of your own free will? 
MR. LOPEZ: Yes. 
MR. MITSUNAGA: Has either the prosecutor 
or the Judge promised you any leniency or proba-
tion? 
MR. LOPEZ: No. 
MR. MITSUNAGA: I have nothing further, 
your Honor. 
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From the foregoing dialogue, it is clear that the appe]. 
lant understood the consequences of his plea of guilty, and 
that it could result in his being sentenced to the Utah Stat.e 
Prison. Moreover, his plea was voluntarily made, without 
coercion or undue influence, and thus was completely in 
accord with the Utah standard of accepting guilty pleas. 
Strong V. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P. 2d 323 ( 1969). 
The thrust of appellant's argument seems to be that 
the court must advise him of the consequences of his plea, 
and that for his counsel to so advise him is error, thus giv. 
ing rise to habeas corpus relief. Such a contention is with-
out merit. 
In Greenwood v. Harp, 432 P. 2d 663 (Okla. Cr. 1967), 
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Okliahoma rejected a 
similar argument. Greenwood appealed from a denial of a 
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds rbhat his plea of guilty 
was not pursuant to an explanation of his constitutional 
rights. However, the writ was denied because the evidence 
at the hearing showed that the petitioner iwas thoroughly 
advised by his counsel of aU constitutional rights relating to 
his case. The Oklahoma Court affirmed the trial court's de-
cision on the grounds that: 
"From the testimony gathered at the district 
court hearing, we are unable to accept petitioner's 
claim that he did not knowingly enter his plea of 
guilty, notwithstanding the innocent ignorance he 
portrays. To accept petitioner's 
tentions, in face of the testimony contamed rn tlus 
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record, would make a mockery of our system of jur-
isprudence." 432 P. 2d at 664. 
The instant case is even stronger for such a holding 
than is the Greenwood case. Here the appellant was in-
terrogated by his own counsel, in the presence of the court 
' as to his understanding of the plea he was making. Surely, 
for one to argue that simply because the interrogation was 
not conducted personally by the judge, would be to place 
procedure over substance, and would result in "a mockery 
of our system of jurisprudence." Id. at 664. 
The appellant cites Belgard v. Turner, Case No. C 95-
69 (1969) decided by the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah, Central Division, Judge Christensen, 
presiding, and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969) as 
authority for his contentions. However, both of these ca.ses 
were decided on whether or not the record was sufficient 
to show an understanding and voluntary plea of guilty, and 
not on the issue of who conducted the interrogation in order 
to establish a record showing the plea of guilty to be know-
ing and voluntary. 
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court 
should be affirmed on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should not judicially decide the issues raised 
on this appeal because of a prior final judgment which is 
res judicata as to this habeas corpus proceeding. 
In the alternative, if this Court accepts the issues 
raised and judicially decides them, then the trial court 
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should be affirmed in light of the record, the facts, and the 
case law applicable to this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
